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Abstract 
This paper studies how both pension systems and well-being at work can be improved to 
postpone retirement in European households. The analysis draws on the first 8 waves (1994-
2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). Option values for retirement are 
constructed from a pool of four countries: Finland, Belgium, Germany and Spain, all relying on 
public-sector mandated pensions. The pooled estimation strategy diminishes the caveats of 
using an existing institutional setting to examine the incentives of introducing a new pension 
system. Pension reforms have to implement higher pension rights accruals than what has so far 
been introduced in pension reforms during the 2000s. Actuarial adjustment for reduction of 
pensions by 5%-points for each year of early retirement and even greater additions to pensions 
for postponed retirement would increase retirement age by around 4.4 years on average and 
even up to 6 years in Belgium and Germany. Pecuniary incentives are not dwarfed by joint 
retirement. The alternatives of improving well-being at work or improving health have minor 
effects. 
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Flexible Pension Systems 
Postponed Retirement and Distributional Fairness 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 61/October 2008 
Hannu Piekkola 
1. Introduction 
The sustainability of European pension systems has been undermined by the increasing share of 
older people as a result of low fertility, increased life expectancy, the ageing of the baby-boom 
generations and by low European labour force participation, in particular of older workers who 
are 55-64 years. In 1999-2003 we saw some recovery in labour force participation in many 
European countries, especially in Finland (up 10%), Belgium (up 3%) and Spain 
(unemployment of workers 55+ halved in 2002 compared with 1994). Part of this can also be 
explained by the first big wave of pension reforms across Europe. New measures – like the 
transitional rise of the early or normal retirement age – may have been effective. We are, 
however, lacking precise estimates of behavioural responses to the changing pension systems. 
This paper simulates pension reforms and other supply side factors in explaining the retirement 
transitions of Europeans. The aim is to benefit from cross-country comparisons. 
In Europe the option value model was first applied in countries that participated in Gruber and 
Wise’s project entitled: Social security and retirement around the world (1999), but 
distinctively for each country.
1 The first descriptive phase of the project found a striking 
correlation between labour force participation and social security incentives. The second phase 
of the project carried out micro-estimations of the impact of social security on retirement and 
found a causal relationship between social security incentives like the option value and labour 
force participation (Gruber and Wise, 2002). However, there was no experiment on pension 
reforms. Some of the spikes in pension wealth at particular ages would indeed be much too tight 
for existing institutional factors in a single country study. 
Option values are here constructed that account for household behaviour in four countries: 
Belgium, Finland, Germany and Spain.
2 All these countries rely on defined benefit rules and 
primarily on the first and second pillars of the pension system. OECD (2003) finds that the 
implicit tax rates embedded in the old-age pension and early retirement schemes are particularly 
high in these countries (Finland was not examined in this study). For Finland, the option value 
approach has been found to have significant effects (Hakola, 2002, and Laine, 2004). Dellis et 
al. (2001) found in Belgium that postponed retirement yielded no gain (social security accruals 
were negative) for over half the people as early as age 58 and for most people aged 60 and 
above. In Germany, Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) also found that the German pension system 
provided strong incentives to retire early and Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) find modest 
changes in retirement paths arising from the 2001/2004 pension reforms. Boldrin et al. (2002) 
find only modest effects in their study of the Spanish pension system. Spain and Finland have 
                                                      
1 The 12 participating countries in the Social security and retirement around the world project are 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and 
the US (Gruber and Wise, 1999; 2002). 
2 Stock and Wise (1990) develop a structural option value model that measures the gain in utility from 
delaying retirement until the optimal age and find that this predicts retirement well in a sample of workers 
from one firm (for structural models, see also Diamond and Gruber, 1999).  2 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
been reforming pension systems in the 2000s by extending the earnings period that is used for 
calculating pension entitlement. Instead of using the years of highest earnings towards the end 
of career, the earnings period is extended to a much longer period in Spain or to the entirety of 
an individual’s earnings history in Finland (other European countries with similar pension 
reforms are Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Portugal, Italy). According to the Social 
Protection Committee (2006), none of the four countries considered are implementing a very 
drastic levelling down of pensions. The target of abolishing early retirement has also been clear 
but early retirement is more markedly reformed in Germany only. 
Our analysis uses the 8 waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). The advantage of this method is that we can examine financial incentives in a pooled 
data set from four countries. While the option value approach does not miss large spikes in 
pension wealth at particular ages, some of the spikes would be much too tied up for existing 
institutional factors in a single country study. It is well known that health and work satisfaction 
are important for retirement decisions, but are dwarfed by pecuniary incentives. Since much of 
the analysis in this paper is also on the quantitative change in retirement years, it is of interest to 
measure the relative influence of health and work satisfaction after pecuniary incentives have 
been appropriately accounted for. Clark (2001) finds that job satisfaction is the most 
determinant predictor of quits from jobs besides satisfaction with pay, but the results can also 
relate to dissatisfaction with pay. 
We also analyse whether the spouse’s option value to defer retirement influences the retirement 
decision. Here, the age difference between spouses is taken into account. The European 
evidence provided by Zweimuller et al. (1996) for Austria, Blau and Riphahn (1999) for 
Germany and Garcia et al. (2005) for the EU countries in the ECHP shows that joint retirement 
is frequent among married couples. Coile (2004) finds that women and men react similarly to 
their own incentive measures, but the husband’s retirement is sensitive to spillover effects from 
the wife and not vice versa. 
In pension reforms during the 2000s actuarial accrual deductions at early retirement and 
increments thereafter are used in Spain and Germany, and to a more moderate degree in 
Finland. Our uniform pension reform proposes more drastic incentives. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2002), using US survey data from the Health and Retirement Study, find that the 3% annual 
pension accrual is not enough for a large percentage of workers, which explains early retirement 
at age 62. An actuarial neutral pension system at age 60 would have an accrual rate of around 
4%. Thus, the pension increase of 4% for one year’s postponement of retirement matches the 
loss from the shorter period left as a result of retiring at age 60. In pooled data we simulate an 
actuarial adjustment for reduction of pensions by a 5%-point for each year of early retirement 
pension before age 63 and an annual increase in pension rights of up to 7%-points if retirement 
is postponed beyond the age of 63. This follows the suggested reform for Germany by Berkel 
and Börsch-Supan (2004) and is comparable to the Spanish early retirement schemes with a 
deduction of pension rights by 8%-points per year for retirement prior to age 65 (but with 
minimum pensions). The new pension system in Finland effective as of 2005 with an actuarial 
adjustment of 4.5% rather leaves the pension expenditures at the same level (for given 
retirement patterns). In Germany the most important change in the 2000s was the abolishment 
of early retirement since there are no exceptions for the unemployed and women. The second 
reform is the change of age when actuarial adjustment begins from 60 to 65 years of age.  
The main findings are that pension reforms have to implement higher pension rights accruals 
than what has been introduced in the pension reforms during the 2000s in order to postpone 
retirement age by many years. It is also shown that health and work satisfaction have relatively 
little influence on retirement, as does the spouse’s retirement decision. Finally, even a radical 
pension reform would be distributionally fair towards poor-income households. The structure of FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 3 
 
the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes pension incentives and section 3 describes the data 
and the empirical strategy used. The results are discussed in section 4 and pension reform 
simulations are performed in section 5. Section 6 examines the distributional effect before the 
conclusion in section 7. 
2.  The pension incentives 
We apply the option value model for the pension systems in Belgium, Finland, Germany and 
Spain and then use the observed hazard rates to simulate pension reforms. The option value 
calculates the utility gain from working until some future retirement date A relative to retiring 
today ￿ and does not miss large spikes in pension wealth at particular ages (Stock and Wise, 
1990). Each household member decides upon his/her labour supply and consumption path based 
on the earnings and pension at the current period, τ = A . Indirect utility over work and leisure 
for the non-retired is as follows: 
[]
γ γ τ
τ
τ
δα χ δ
−
−− − −−
−
==
⎡⎤ =+ + + + ⎣⎦ ∑∑
1
() ( ) ( )
1 () ( 1 ) ( 1 )  (, )( 1 )
AT
tt A t A
tt A
tt A
VA Y P A Y , (1) 
where T = the expected age of death at each age t, ￿ = the current period, A = the period of 
retirement, ￿= the real discount factor,  t Y = the income while working,  1 (, ) A PAY− = the 
retirement benefits at the time of retirement,  t χ = the index for the pension, γ  = the utility 
curvature parameter or the risk aversion parameter (assuming isoelastic utility function) and 
α >=1 is a parameter to account for the relative utility of the pension benefits to the wages or 
the marginal utility of leisure. The index for pension χ  follows the evolution of the consumer 
price index in Belgium and Spain and the wage index in Germany. Pension rights before 65 in 
Finland are indexed at 50% on wages and at 50% on consumer prices and the indices for 
pensions from 65 onwards are set at 80% on prices and 20% on wages. (See the appendix for 
details.) Life expectancy is evaluated by age and gender.
3 The utility parameters are α =1.5, 
γ =0.75 and the discount rate ￿ is set at 3%, which is half of the 6% used by Coile (2004). 
The option value of retirement A, giving the opportunity cost of retiring today ￿, is 
[ ] ττ τ =− () () ( ) OV A E V A V , (2) 
where E = the expectation operator. Optimal retirement should occur at periods (ages) 
* A  
where the option value is (most) negative. We examine pecuniary incentives for the household 
as a whole. Retired couples spend a considerable time together and therefore pension income 
can be expected to be shared. (For Finnish evidence of joint time use, see Niemi, 2005.) If a 
spouse has a high option value from not retiring, say, in five years, the individual may not retire 
today even if the individual’s own option value is negative. An individual with a younger 
spouse may also have a high option value for continuing to work, which significantly raises 
one’s own optimal retirement age. Since we have a priori no information on how option values 
should be added up, the option values of household members are included separately in the 
estimations. We use the option value both for employed and non-employed spouses, where the 
latter uses the predicted earnings. As additional explanatory variables we include a spouse’s 
employment status and the age difference between spouses. 
                                                      
3 Life expectancy at age 60 – in the age range when retirement transitions are made – has been rising all 
over Europe on average by 1.6 years up to 22.1 years during 1991-2002 in the EU area, but men and 
women in Finland, Belgium and Germany still have a lower life expectancy than the European average. 4 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
We include pension wealth in estimations as one explanatory variable in order to capture how 
wealth affects retirement behaviour. The pension wealth of individuals in period t is simply 
τ δ
−−
−
=
=+ ∑
()
1 (, ) ( 1 )
T
tA
A
tA
PW P A Y  (4) 
The OV modelling strategy is as follows. 
1.  Pooled estimation strategy: The OV parameters are taken as given and are set equally across 
countries. We thus first follow an ‘IV strategy’ for this variable and interpret the results 
accordingly.  
2.  Country-specific estimations: The OV parameters are estimated separately for each country 
with the rest of the parameters and compared with pooled estimation strategy. 
3.  Non-pecuniary incentives: The joint retirement decision is evaluated through a spouse’s 
employment position, potential option value (irrespective of whether employed or not) and 
via the age difference between spouses. The estimates are imprecise since we also include in 
the data single adult households that are 20% of the estimation sample. 
4.  Job satisfaction and health are examined as alternative non-pecuniary incentives. 
5.  Uniform pension reform experiments: The OV parameters are used to evaluate the overall 
change in retirement. 
6.  Fair income distribution: The OV parameters are used to evaluate (i) the change in 
retirement for individuals in poor and rich families according to household pension wealth 
and (ii) overall change in the net present value of pension wealth that account for hazard 
rates of retirement at each age. 
The option for retirement is calculated for the age of 54 and beyond. Pension and tax rules are 
adapted from the pension system and pension rules for the year 2000 (see Appendix A). OECD 
(2000, 2001) is the main source for pension calculations. We do not take into account the 
pension incentives of the third pillars of the pension system, as those data were lacking (the 
second pillar is included in Belgium). Appendix A describes the complex and differing pension 
rules in the four countries. 
As a proxy for labour market experience we use the age less education years less 6 years (e.g. in 
Finland, 12 years deducted for primary, 15 years for secondary and 18 years for tertiary 
education). This gives an average work experience of around 33 years in all countries. The 
figure matches the actual average work experience well, which is 29.6 years in Finland and 38 
years in Spain according to the Social Protection Committee (2006) and 38 years in Germany, 
according to Börsch-Supan et al. (2003). The periods spent in unemployment, inactivity due to 
sickness and disability and early retirement count as affiliation years in the computation of the 
average wage, as in many of the new pension rules (already in the old system in Belgium). 
Unemployment pension applies to an extended unemployment period as of age 58 in Finland 
and as of age 56 or 57 (since 1997) in Germany (whereby in accordance with the Hartz IV 
reforms there will be no more exceptions for unemployed, part-time employees, and women as 
of 2010). The missing years between a person’s age at the time of unemployment and age 65 are 
counted as actual years of service in Finland and to some extent in Germany, but not in Belgium 
and Spain. In Finland the benefit levels of unemployment and disability pension are the most 
generous and close to being the same and therefore unemployment pension rules are applied for 
all early retired prior to age 60. In Germany, we apply the same rules for the early retired as for 
old-age pensioners, which include an annual accrual deduction of 3.6%. The number of 
disability pensioners is also low (below 2%).  FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 5 
 
In Belgium the practice of the unemployment system in which people aged 50 or more are 
considered as ‘aged unemployed’ and are not required to actively seek work, has been 
abolished, but not at the time of the study. In disability pensions the normal allowance is 65% of 
lost earnings (subject to a ceiling) for individuals with dependants, but is lower otherwise. In 
Belgium we do not account for the disability pension (around 6% of the sample), and 
individuals simply lose annual accrual increments when retiring earlier.  
In Spain an employee is eligible for unemployment benefits as of age 52 (UB52+ programme) 
when the employee has been unemployed (including the preceding and following years). After 
age 60, a person cannot claim UB52+. The accrual increments are tied to age and work 
experience and include an 8% annual accrual deduction when retiring prior to age 65 (with a 
maximum deduction of 60% at age 60). All the non-employed under 60 years of age are 
assumed to be on an unemployment benefit pipeline before retiring at age 60 (higher benefit for 
the first 160 days and then receiving ‘pensions’ that take into account the penalising factor of 
60%). The rules changed slightly in pension reform in 1997 (see Appendix). 
3.  Data and empirical model 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is an annual panel study and consists of a 
household and a personal file. The same individuals and families are interviewed over time. The 
advantage of these country data is their high comparability. The survey provides a detailed 
account of income and employment status. We constructed an unbalanced panel of women and 
men aged 54 to 64 for four countries: Finland, Belgium, Germany and Spain (8 waves from 
1994 to 2001 for the countries studied except for 6 waves for Finland). The panel is left-
censored, as we include only persons who are working (as defined before). There is right 
censoring, due to missing interviews and missing transitions. The final sample has been 
constructed in different stages. In the first stage we dropped individuals who lacked social 
security incentive variables. In the second stage we excluded the special category of the self-
employed, as they may have different pension system rules. 9,350 individuals out of 33,400 
observations for age 54-64 are employed (but for many only for one period). 
Estimated earnings use the OLS estimation for the full-time employed (working week exceeds 
20 hours). The earnings of the employed are replaced by estimated earnings if the predicted 
earnings deviate more than 5 standard deviations from actual earnings (1,845 out of 33,400 
observations; the share of observations is 2.1% in Belgium, 1.2% in Finland, 1.3% in Germany, 
15.6% in Spain). The estimation of wages was done separately for each country and by gender, 
and explanatory variables include age, age squared, log weekly working hours, supervisory job, 
two-adult household, spouse employed, self-reported health, owner-occupied house, lag 
unemployment, public-sector job, firm size, and year dummies; (details are available upon 
request). Earnings are further evaluated as an average of the last two years in 2000 prices (or 
using earnings from last year if the earnings were 50% lower in the previous year). A person is 
only considered as working when self-reported status is normally working not inactive 
(pe200a=1 and pe200=3 in ECHP) and not working less than 15 hours (all self-employed are 
also excluded). 42% of individuals at age group 53-59 and 13% of individuals at age group 60-
64 are still working. Employed persons with annual earnings below 5000€ are also considered 
as being retired (919 obs.). This means that all those in the unemployed and disabled segments 
are considered as retired. More complex histories with at least one reverse transition have been 
excluded from the sample. Reverse transitions accounted for a minor share of a maximum of 2% 
of the individuals (most common in Germany).  
We use the earnings model to assess the individual earnings profile similarly to Boldrin et al. 
(2002) and above, but this time separately by gender at three education levels. We use the 6 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
estimated parameters to impute the earnings of the censored observations. We project earnings 
forward and backward in the following way. 
•  Forward: here we assume 1% real growth. 
•  Backward:  −− − −− =+ 1 ˆ () Tkl Tk Tk ww g a , 
where  − Tk w  is observed wages in year  = − t Tk  (T current period, k lag when last employed) 
and  −− ˆTkl w  is estimated wages for the lag  1,..., lL = . The function  (.) g corrects for the growth 
of log earnings defined as:  β −− −− =+ 1 () * Tkl Tkl ga a  
ββ β −− − − −−
22
21 2 ** * Tkl Tk Tk aa a andβ ββ = 12 , ’s are estimated coefficients in a wage 
regression. 
Based on all criteria, the estimation sample includes up to 4871 employed individuals of 54-64 
years of age (Finland: 835, Belgium: 492, Germany: 2117, Spain: 1427) with an average spell of 
2.4 years (only 1.5 years in Spain whereas over 4 years in Germany and Finland). A close look 
at the European Household Panel (ECHP) data summary Table A.1 in the appendix using the 
national survey weights and the estimation sample provides some useful information about 
further decisions concerning the model specification. In about 65% of our sample persons who 
are employed are males and the most frequent retirement age is 60 years of age. Health 
information is a potentially important determinant of retirement. In Table A.1 the sample share 
of people with self-reported bad health (bad or very bad category) varies between countries. In 
particular, a high share of German women (23.7%) and men (21.1%) report being in bad health. 
Belgium has unreliably small shares below 1%, whereas Finland has about 4.5%. We therefore 
include stays in hospital (the previous 12 months) as an additional explanatory variable.  
Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows the share of employed people that withdraw from employment 
per age and gender. It can be seen that the average share of those who withdraw from work is 
below 10% before the age of 59 and over 20% after that (see also Table A.1).  Data for Belgium 
shows very early retirement, as virtually all women beyond the age of 60 are retired, and 
retirement propensities are low from age 60 onwards. Spikes are more pronounced for females 
and in general in Germany and Belgium, especially at ages 60 and 65. Finland has steadily 
increasing transitions, while in Spain retirement is concentrated on an age close to 65 years. The 
absence of spike at around age 60 in Spain is likely to be explained by sample criterion with 
very short spells (1.5 years) and less than 30% of individuals being women. The share of older 
age group 60-64 out of all employed 54 years or over is also relatively high above 30% (see 
Table A.1). 
We rely on the duration model approach, where retirement is treated as a dynamic discrete 
choice.
4 The variable that explains this is the duration of employment, and the failure is defined 
as retiring in the next period. The variable of interest is the length of duration T, which elapses 
from the beginning of employment until its end into retirement or until the measurement is 
taken, which may precede termination. Assume T is a random variable that has a continuous 
probability distribution f(t). The probability of the spell length of employment being smaller or 
equal to a particular value t or the cumulative distribution function is as follows: 
                                                      
4 The hazard model approach is based on Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Hausman and Wise (1985). 
The hazard model that treats the retirement decision as a dynamic discrete choice has been used in other 
empirical studies such as Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) for Germany, Mastrogiacomo et al. (2002) for the 
Netherlands and Bütler et al. (2004) for Switzerland. FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 7 
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The survival function S or the probability that the spell of the working period is of length of at 
least t is given by: 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
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0
) ( exp ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( λ . (6) 
The hazard rate h is the rate at which spells are completed at time t, given that they have lasted 
until t. It can be interpreted as the age-specific failure rate and is given by 
) ( 1
) (
) (
) ( ) (
lim ) (
0 t F
t f
t S
t f
t
t T t t T t P
t h
t −
= =
Δ
≥ Δ + < ≤
=
→ Δ
 (7) 
So far, the distribution of the stochastic dependent variable duration has not been specified; thus 
the duration can follow any known distribution. In this study duration model estimates are based 
on a parametric Weibull distribution, where the survival function is given by 
() e x p ( )
p St t λ =−, where  1 p >  indicates that hazard rates increase with time (as is found to be 
the case here). The very important advantage of the duration analysis is that censored spells can 
be taken into account. The probit estimates are likely to be biased downwards due to left 
censoring. The duration model gives incentive effects twice as high as the probit model (not 
reported). 
4. Estimation  results 
Duration model results are reported for the pooled estimation strategy in Table 1. The results of 
a second strategy of allowing parameters to change by country are reported in Table 2. We 
report the risk ratio e
β, where ￿ is the coefficient estimate. Thus, the value e
0.39=1.37 for initial 
bad health in column 1 in Table 1 below means that the hazard is about 37% higher with self-
reported bad health. In all estimates Weibull distributional assumptions of the hazard rate are 
supported by share value p, which varies around 1.5. Hazard rates thus increase with age. The 
generalised Cox-Snell residuals also indicate that the Weibull model is the most appropriate 
one. 
Table 1. Duration model for retirement at 54-64 years of age 
 All  All  Women  Men 
Option value  0.88***  0.88***  0.82***  0.91*** 
 (-9.2)  (-9.5)  (-7.7)  (-6.2) 
Option value spouse  0.99    0.98  1.00 
 (-0.6)    (-0.4)  (0.1) 
Pension wealth  1.01*  1.01*  1.03*  1.02+ 
 (2.0)  (2.2)  (2.2)  (1.8) 
Married 1.27  0.92  2.40  0.82 
 (1.0)  (-0.9)  (1.6)  (-0.7) 
Employed spouse  0.90    1.16  0.74 
 (-0.7)    (0.5)  (-1.5) 
Male 1.12  1.16+     
 (1.3)  (1.7)     8 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Age difference  1.01    1.01  1.00 
 (1.2)    (1.6)  (-0.1) 
Initial work satisfaction  0.96  0.96  0.92  0.99 
 (-1.3)  (-1.1)  (-1.5)  (-0.4) 
Initial leisure satisfaction  1.07+  1.06+  1.03  1.08+ 
 (1.8)  (1.8)  (0.5)  (1.9) 
Initial bad health  1.38**  1.39**  1.00  1.73*** 
 (2.9)  (3.0)  (0.0)  (3.9) 
Initial bad health spouse  1.00    1.78  0.75 
 (-0.0)    (1.6)  (-0.7) 
Inpatient at hospital  1.69***  1.69***  1.46*  1.76*** 
 (6.2)  (6.2)  (2.5)  (5.5) 
Inpatient at hospital spouse  0.86    0.89  0.80 
 (-0.5)    (-0.3)  (-0.6) 
Tertiary education  0.93  0.92  0.97  0.94 
 (-0.8)  (-0.9)  (-0.1)  (-0.5) 
Supervisory job status  0.74+  0.72*  0.48+  0.73+ 
 (-1.9)  (-2.1)  (-1.7)  (-1.7) 
Part time  0.91  0.89  0.71+  1.36 
 (-0.6)  (-0.8)  (-1.8)  (1.1) 
Public employment  0.78**  0.78**  0.71*  0.79* 
 (-2.9)  (-3.0)  (-2.5)  (-2.1) 
Firm size < 20  0.91  0.92  1.05  0.86 
 (-1.1)  (-1.0)  (0.4)  (-1.4) 
Owner occupied  0.91  0.92  1.00  0.85 
 (-1.2)  (-1.0)  (0.0)  (-1.6) 
        
Observations 4871  4886  1732  3139 
No. of subjects  1864  1868  687  1177 
No. of failures  832  837  275  557 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1486.32  -1495.16  -496.91  -964.57 
Degrees of freedom  22  17  21  21 
p (Weibull)  1.55  1.55  1.49  1.60 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
In Table 1 it can be seen that, as expected, the option value has a negative impact on the 
propensity to leave employment, as the risk ratio is below unity. The interpretation of the hazard 
ratio can be done with reference to two persons whose option values are OV and OV+1. 
Column 1 in Table 1 shows that the individual with the higher option value has a hazard that is 
12%, so the probability of retirement over a short period of time is considerably high in the 
pooled data. (That is, the ratio of their respective hazards is 0.88.) Re-estimating the model with 
other values for lifetime utility function parameters (the marginal utility of leisure parameter α  
and the discount rate ￿) suggests that the effect of the option value on retirement is robust, 
however, a change in the utility curvature parameter gamma from 1.5 to the assumed 0.75 
considerably strengthens the marginal effect). 
Gender-specific estimations in columns 3 and 4 show that the pecuniary incentives are 
somewhat stronger for women than for men. However, Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that 
men have higher option values to stay in the market than females on average. (The average 
option value is around 6 for both genders) Although not directly comparable, the option value 
effects are significant and in magnitude similar to those in a US probit analysis by Coile (2004). FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 9 
 
Next, we can see that wealthier individuals (with more pension wealth) retire earlier. Berkel and 
Börsch-Supan (2004) also find significant wealth effects from unearned income in general in 
Germany, but we do not have enough information here on wealth other than pension wealth to 
examine this. 
A general finding is that a joint retirement decision plays only a minor role. A spouse’s 
employment status or age difference has only a limited effect on retirement propensity. The 
spouse’s option value is also insignificant in columns 1, 3 and 4 in Table 1. Finally, a 
comparison of columns 1 and 2 reveals that hazard rates for individual option values are also 
robust whether we take into account the option values for the employed spouse or not. We next 
analyse the importance of non-pecuniary incentives related to work characteristics, job and 
leisure satisfaction (not available for Germany and set at zero in pooled estimates) and health. 
We use initial health and satisfaction measures at the beginning of the spell to lower the 
endogeneity. Estimates would not change much if current instead of initial values were used 
(see Clark, 2001, for similar findings). It is seen here that job satisfaction and the profession 
(supervisory job status) are insignificant. (We also have in the model occupational dummies for 
managers and professionals, technicians and service workers that are not reported.) Leisure 
satisfaction increases the hazard rate of exit from employment and is significant at 10%. 
However, job and leisure satisfaction little clean the estimated coefficients of the option values 
from some non-economic effects as these are robust to their inclusion. 
It is seen that good health (whether measured by self-reported health status or as an inpatient at 
a hospital in the previous 12 months) postpones retirement. Women report themselves as having 
worse health than men (14.9% in contrast to 13.4% of men). However, bad health only 
influences men’s retirement (producing a hazard rate of 73% for men). A fairly large share of all 
individuals has received hospital care (over 10% with inpatient care at a hospital in the past 12 
months) and the hazard rates are again steeper for men (76%) than for women (46%). This is 
probably the only reliable measure for Belgium, where the self-reported bad health share was 
very low. 
An important final finding is that after all these controls the differences in the opportunity set 
attributed to the education level (tertiary education) are no longer significant. Civil servants are 
modelled to be part of the standard social security system, but the higher maximal replacement 
rates in Finland and Spain have been taken into account. Civil servants in Belgium also have to 
work longer, with a retirement age of 65, but disability channels are frequent. It is seen from 
Table 1 that working in the public sector in general decreases retirement propensity. It is also 
seen that workers in small firms who have owner-occupied houses tend to retire later, but the 
effects are insignificant. 
If we turn in greater detail to the country-specific analysis in Table 2, we see that the effects of 
option values vary to some degree but the overall picture is similar.  
Table 2. Duration model by country at 54-64 years of age 
 Finland  Belgium  Germany  Spain 
Option  value  0.71***  0.95 0.88*** 0.89*** 
  (-6.2) (-0.5) (-8.1) (-3.7) 
Option  value  spouse  1.08 1.02 0.98 1.00 
  (1.2)  (0.1) (-1.0) (-0.1) 
Pension wealth  1.03*  1.03  1.02+  1.01 
  (2.1) (0.9) (1.8) (0.5) 
Married  2.06 0.84 1.02 1.19 
  (1.2)  (-0.3) (0.1) (0.3) 10 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Employed  spouse  0.42+ 0.64 1.05 0.85 
 (-1.7)  (-0.5)  (0.2)  (-0.3) 
Male 1.69*  1.29  0.92  1.87** 
 (2.3)  (0.9)  (-0.7)  (2.6) 
Age  difference  1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 
  (1.0)  (-0.3) (0.4) (0.7) 
Initial work satisfaction  0.94  0.79*    1.00 
 (-0.7)  (-2.2)    (-0.0) 
Initial leisure satisfaction  1.14  1.15    0.99 
 (1.6)  (1.3)    (-0.2) 
Initial bad health  2.05+  2.51  1.29*  1.61 
  (1.9) (1.5) (2.0) (1.6) 
Initial bad health spouse  2.44  1.31  1.18  0.41 
 (1.1)  (0.3)  (0.5)  (-0.9) 
Inpatient  at  hospital  1.87**  0.81 1.65*** 1.83*** 
  (3.0)  (-0.5) (4.4) (3.3) 
Inpatient at hospital spouse  0.99  2.34  0.70  2.22 
 (-0.0)  (1.1)  (-0.9)    (0.7) 
Tertiary  education  0.99 1.17 1.05 0.71 
 (-0.0)  (0.6)  (0.3)  (-1.0) 
Supervisory job status  0.53*  0.85    0.80 
 (-2.3)  (-0.4)    (-0.8) 
Part  time  0.69 1.21 0.77 0.78 
  (-1.2)  (0.5) (-1.0) (-0.6) 
Public employment  0.93  1.76*  0.67**  0.82 
  (-0.3)  (2.1) (-3.1) (-1.1) 
Firm size < 20  0.95  0.75  0.98  0.69* 
  (-0.2) (-0.7) (-0.1) (-2.3) 
Owner occupied  1.24  0.91  0.84+  1.16 
 (0.7)  (-0.3)  (-1.7)  (0.6) 
      
Observations 835  492  2117  1427 
No. of subjects  399  198  708  559 
No. of failures  132  84  387  229 
Log  pseudolikelihood  -245.79 -135.61 -624.54 -424.08 
Degrees  of  freedom  22 21 19 22 
p  (Weibul)  1.70 1.99 1.43 1.62 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
It is seen from Table 2 that the hazard rates of option values are significant in the range of 11%-
29%, but are insignificant for Belgium. In Belgium virtually all women retire before they reach 
60 years of age, and apparently also for some non-economic reasons. The generous early 
retirement pensions can hence be expected to enhance early retirement, especially in Finland 
and in Germany, where the option values to postpone retirement are also highest (see later 
Figure 2). In Spain incentive effects are limited by the large share of receivers of the minimum 
pension, by restrictions on the maximum pension and by later retirement close to 65 years of 
age (possibly also due to a biased sample). Despite this, we find that the pension systems do 
explain retirement in Spain, which differs from Boldrin et al. (2002), who use another data set 
for the same period. FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 11 
 
In order to analyse the distributional effects of pension policies it is of interest to examine 
whether financial incentives differ for poor and rich families. We define household pension 
wealth as the sum of spouses’ pension wealth or that of an individual (if there is no spouse) 
standardised by the size of the household size using the McClement scales (1978). The family’s 
capital income has practically no correlation (0.08) with it, which is the reason why we exclude 
reported capital income from the analysis. Table 3 examines retirement behaviour. Families in 
the bottom and top quartiles in household pension wealth in each country are separately pooled 
together (the households in the top 1% and lowest 1% of family pension wealth are omitted as 
outliers).  
Table 3. Duration model, pooling individuals with household pension wealth below 25
th or 
above 75
th decile in overall distribution of household pension wealth in each country at 
54-64 years of age 
 Below  25
th Above  75
th 
Option value  0.83***  0.88*** 
 (-5.9)  (-3.5) 
Option value spouse  1.02  0.97 
 (0.3)  (-1.0) 
Pension wealth  1.03  1.02* 
 (1.2)  (2.2) 
Married 1.37  1.94 
 (0.8)  (0.6) 
Employed spouse  0.58  1.32 
 (-0.7)  (0.9) 
Male 1.00  0.91 
 (0.0)  (-0.4) 
Age difference  1.01  1.01 
 (1.5)  (0.7) 
Initial work satisfaction  0.88+  1.02 
 (-1.8)  (0.3) 
Initial leisure satisfaction  1.13  1.08 
 (1.6)  (0.8) 
Initial bad health  1.35  1.72+ 
 (1.3)  (1.8) 
Initial bad health spouse  0.76  2.13 
 (-0.3)  (1.5) 
Inpatient at hospital  1.90***  1.77* 
 (3.9)  (2.4) 
Inpatient at hospital spouse  0.00***  1.40 
 (-16.8)  (0.9) 
Tertiary education  0.89  0.91 
 (-0.4)  (-0.4) 
Supervisory job status  1.47  0.42** 
 (0.7)  (-2.8) 
Part time  0.68  0.97 
 (-1.3)  (-0.1) 
Public employment  0.88  0.59* 
 (-0.7)  (-2.4) 
Firm size < 20  1.07  0.70 
 (0.4)  (-1.4) 12 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Owner occupied  0.84  1.58+ 
 (-0.9)  (1.8) 
    
Observations 1111  977 
No. of subjects  446  418 
No. of failures  186  122 
Log pseudolikelihood  -335.33  -211.29 
Degrees of freedom  22  22 
p (Weibul)  1.54  1.80 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
It is seen that the pecuniary effects remain the same as before, and do not much differ for low 
and high household pension wealth families. Option values are also almost the same at around 7 
for poor and rich families, whereas average household pension wealth is 6.8 for low and 20.1 
for high household pension wealth families (in €10,000, year 2000 values). The probability for 
retirement is around 12% higher for high household pension wealth families merely due to the 
differences in family pension wealth. The effect is not large enough to give strong support for 
‘an added worker effect’, when pension wealth is too low and the worker is forced to stay longer 
in working life. Health parameters are the same, whereas, obviously, occupational effects differ. 
5. Pension  reform 
We evaluate retirement patterns after launching a flexible pension system with higher actuarial 
increments and flexible retirement between 63 and 67 years of age. The actuarial adjustment 
resembles the new pension system in Finland in structure, which has gradually started to 
become established since 2005. The estimated hazard rates can also be used to compute the net 
present value of lifetime pension wealth. The net present value of pension wealth over the 
current and 10 future periods starting with the current period ￿ is given by 
[]
τ
τ
τ
+
−
=
=+ ∑
10
,1 (,) ()( , ) ii D i i i A
A
NPVZ h A X h A P A Y , (8) 
where  (,) i hA X is the conditional probability of retirement and  () Di hA  is the conditional 
probability of death (by gender) at period A starting from the current period τ = 0. The 
conditional probabilities in each period vary with time (age) and are given by estimated 
conditional hazards in the Weibull distribution. Using the shape value of  p =1.55 in the Weibull 
distribution, the conditional hazard rates are dropped to one quarter of the initial value in six 
periods and are close to zero in the maximum of the eleven periods considered. Thus we can 
safely limit the calculation of the net present value for 11 periods, since expected retirement 
takes place with almost 100% certainty earlier. The conditional probability of retirement 
(,) i hA X can be written using the estimated unconditional hazard rates as  
= ˆ ( 0 ,) ( 0 ,) ii ii hXhX   for A = 0;  (9) 
=− − ˆ (,)( 1 ( 1 ,) ) (,) ii i hA X hA XhA X for  A=1,…,10 , 
where 
− =
1 ˆˆ (,) ( )
p
ii h A X EXP bX pA  and  ˆ b  are the estimated coefficients for the explanatory 
variables  X  and  p  is the shape value in the Weibull distribution. In simulations we rely on FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 13 
 
pooled estimation strategy (estimates from column 1 in Table 1), but also report results when 
using country-specific parameters from Table 2. We ignore those observations for which our 
calculations predict optimal retirement at 80 years of age or over (not changing our results). At 
the second stage, we aggregate the net present value of pension wealth and option values using 
the national survey weights. In aggregating the results over the four countries, we simply use 
country sample sizes as weights and not the country’s size of population. The estimation sample 
is three times larger for Germany and twice as high for Spain than for Finland or Belgium on 
average, so the largest countries are given roughly three times higher weight.  
The flexible pension system experimented resembles in structure the new one introduced in 
Finland: 
•  A unified pension system in all countries with actuarial adjustment: the annual accrual rate 
to replacement rate is 1.5%-points for the 18-53 year age bracket; 1.9%-points for the 53-60 
year age bracket; and 7%-points for the 61-68 year age bracket.
 5 
•  The pension is based on the entire working career with 80% wage and 20% inflation 
indexation on past earnings (Finland had 50% wage and 50% inflation indexation for the 
last ten years of earning, Belgium 100% inflation indexation, Germany 100% wage 
indexation and Spain a complex combination of both, see Appendix A for details). 
•  The pensions are indexed entirely by inflation. (The new Finnish system gives 20% weight 
on the wage index). 
•  No limit is set for maximal replacement rate and no minimum or maximal pension. 
The higher accrual increment 1.9%-points as of 53 years of age benefits highly educated 
workers who have a steep wage profile (as applied in the new pension system in Finland). 
However, pensions based on earnings over the lifetime and not on last earnings moderate 
pension levels considerably. Pensionable wage (the average earnings for certain years) is 15% 
lower due to calculations using lifetime earnings and not the last ten years at work (which was 
the rule in the pension system prior to 2005 in Finland and Belgium, and also in Spain before 
1997, see Appendix A for details). The annual accrual rate to replacement rate of 7%-points 
since 63 years of age is on the extreme side of added incentives. Finally, the new system in 
Finland also levels down pensions where the life expectancy of the population increases, but 
this option is not taken into account in this experiment.  
In Finland the extended periods for unemployment benefits for older workers may still allow 
‘early retirement’ as of age 57 in the new pension system. The Central Pension Security Institute 
in Finland has estimated that the new pension system postpones retirement only by one year on 
average (Central Pension Security Institute, 2002). Most of the new pension reforms in other 
countries indeed impose a real cut in pension benefits. In order to have more remarkable 
postponement in retirement, we use notably higher accrual deductions. We therefore penalise 
retirement before the age of 63. 
•  Pension rights decrease annually by a 5%-point for early retirement prior to age 63 reaching 
the maximum deduction of 30% at age 56 or below and there is no other early retirement 
scheme.  
The new Finnish system only yields an additional cut once and for all in pensions by 7% if 
retirement takes place at age 62 or earlier. Spain has instead an analogous deduction to the 
proposed one for early retirement prior to age 65 (but minimum pensions cover large a share of 
                                                      
5 In all calculations for Finland we account for the fact that accruals are halved for income earned prior to 
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pensioners). Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) similarly argue that the adjustment factors are not 
high enough in the new German pension system. They propose an actuarial adjustment with a 
reduction of 7.2% (instead of 3.6%) for each year of early retirement and an increase of 8.1% 
(instead of 6%) for each year of postponed retirement. Figure 1 first shows the expected 
replacement rates under the old system and in the new system for 60 years of age and for all 
those who are 57-60 years of age in the panel (also shown in Table A.1). 
Figure 1. Replacement rates at age 60 before and after pension reform  
0 % 5 % 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
Spain, Female
Spain, Male
Germany, Female
Germany, Male
Belgium, Female
Belgium, Male
Finland, Female
Finland, Male
All, Female
All, Male
Replacement Rate % Replacement Rate After Pension Reform %
 
Replacement rates are decreased at age 60 on average by 17.8 points (in Figure 1 18.9 points for 
women and 17.2 points for men). The decrease is greatest in Spain, where minimum pensions 
are binding for a large share of retirees. Replacement rates are close to 35% both in Finland and 
Spain, whereas the tax exemptions of the pension incomes lead to the replacement rates staying 
at a relatively high level in Germany. The shifts in replacement rates follow a common trend. In 
the new legislation in the US, average earners retiring at age 62 (considered as early retirees) 
will see their replacement rate fall from 30% today to 23% in 2030. (These replacement rates 
are net of Medicare part B reported in Munnell et al., 2004.) Pension wealth and option value 
before and after reform for employed by age are shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Age profile of pension wealth (in 10000 euro) and option value (mean) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP 1994-2001. 
It can first be seen that variation in option value between countries is lower before the reform 
than can be seen from early country-specific studies, see Figure A.2 showing respective values 
in Dellis et al. (2001) and Börsch-Supan, Kohnz and Schnabel (2003) for Belgium and 
Germany. (In the latter the marginal utility of leisure α  is set at 2.8 instead of 1.5 and the 
curvature parameter γ  is 1 instead of 0.75). The purpose of the pension reform is to increase 
these option values, which are indeed substantially increased after the reform in all the 
countries. It is seen that after the reform the option values are highest in Germany and Belgium 
(in these countries the postponement of retirement is also greatest). It is seen that, after the 
pension reform, pension wealth is increasing by age. The accrual rate around 7% is high enough 
to compensate the loss from the shorter period left in retirement at age 60. A lower accrual rate 
such as 2% accrual for pensioners retiring after 65 years of age would clearly not be enough (as 
introduced in the Spanish 2002 pension reform). 
Next, Table 4 shows, in column 3, the postponement in retirement using the pooled estimation 
strategy (relying on parameters given in Table 1, column 1). We also report results using 
country-specific estimates from Table 2 in column 4. Column 5 gives postponement for low and 
high-household pension wealth families (using pooled data parameters from Table 1 rather than 
from Table 3). 
Table 4. Retirement and postponement in retirement due to the reform in alternative models 16 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Column 12 34 5
Estimates 
by 
Country 
All Female 58.7 59.1 3.7 2.2 Lowest 3.0
Male 58.9 58.8 4.9 0.8 Highest 6.9
Finland Female 59.4 60.0 1.0 3.0 Lowest 0.6
Male 58.3 60.0 1.3 3.5 Highest 2.5
Belgium Female 56.6 59.0 6.7 -0.7 Lowest 4.7
Male 57.9 57.1 6.7 0.5 Highest 7.8
Germany Female 58.3 57.9 5.2 5.7 Lowest 4.0
Male 58.9 58.1 6.7 7.3 Highest 7.3
Spain Female 61.3 60.3 3.2 2.5 Lowest 1.8
Male 59.6 59.5 3.2 1.6 Highest 7.9
Postponed Retirement (years)
Retirement 
Age (Model 
Year 2000)
Gender
Retirement 
Age (Year 
2000)
Columns 3 and 5 are based on estimation in column 1 in table 1; column 4 uses estimation by country 
from table 2.
Household 
Pension Wealth 
Quartile
 
The exit age in 2000 was at about 58 in Belgium, a little below 62 in Germany and a little above 
62 in Finland and 62.5 in Spain, while column 1 shows somewhat earlier retirement age in the 
ECHP sample. The earlier retirement age is explained by the inclusion of unemployed in the 
retired pool. It is seen from column 2 that the predicted average retirement age is close to the 
figures in the sample. Column 3 shows that the postponement in retirement age due to pension 
reform is around 4 years (3.7 years for women and 4.9 years for men. The pension reform 
generates its largest effects in Belgium and Germany with, on average, 6.5 years’ postponed 
retirement. In Finland the postponement is less: 1 year. Next column 4 uses the duration model 
estimated separately in each country (based on table 2). The country-specific duration model 
now gives more pronounced results for Finland, since Finland had the largest parameter values 
for the option values in Table 2. Note that the country-specific duration model would instead 
work poorly for Belgium, yielding no role for pension reform to have any real effect on 
retirement. 
The last column 4 relates to changing retirement for low- and high-family-pension wealth 
families using pooled estimation. It is seen that families with a large amount of accrued pension 
wealth are generally the ones that respond more forcefully to pension reform. Retirement is 
postponed by 7 in contrast to 3 years for poor families. The results would be nearly the same 
when using the country-specific estimation strategy (not reported) or separate parameters for 
poor and rich from Table 3. 
It is of interest to contrast these effects with policies that aim to increase well-being at work or 
to improve health. We assume that well-being at work improves considerably. Job satisfaction 
increases by 20% (by 0.94, the average is 4.5 on the rising scale 1 to 6), and leisure satisfaction 
decreases by an equal amount (by 0.78, the average is 3.9). Job satisfaction and leisure 
satisfaction are highly positively correlated (0.84) and have opposite implications on retirement. 
Therefore, the reform should change both the push and pull factors for early retirement and thus 
also introduce measures that make leisure less attractive. Lower utility of leisure from not 
working at all can be achieved with shortened working hours and better well-being at work. 
Taxes on leisure activities such as time-consuming sports (golf, tennis, fishing) can also be 
introduced. Another reform considered is an ad hoc assumption of a 50% improvement in FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 17 
 
health. The share of workers experiencing bad health (a combination of bad or very bad health) 
is halved from the average of 12% and the share of those having had inpatient care at hospital in 
the previous 12 months is halved from 10%. These figures are not entirely unrealistic, since 
days spent in hospital have halved in many countries over the last 10 years.  
Table 5. Postponement in retirement due to greater job satisfaction and leisure dissatisfaction 
or due to improved health 
Gender
Greater job satis-
faction and leisure 
dissatisfaction 
Improved 
health
All Female 0.3 0.1
Male 0.3 0.1
Finland Female 0.3 0.1
Male 0.3 0.1
Belgium Female 0.2 0.1
Male 0.2 0.0
Germany Female na 0.2
Male na 0.2
Spain Female 0.3 0.1
Male 0.3 0.1
1) 20% greater reported job satisfaction and lower leisure 
satisfaction (mean is 4.47 for job satisfaction and 3.93 for leisure 
satisfaction where scale is from 1 to 6). 
Postponed retirement (years)
2) Share of individuals with self-reported bad health is halved from 
12.3%.  
It can be seen from Table 5 that in the basic model improved well-being at work (and decreased 
utility from leisure) would postpone retirement by around 0.3 years. The improvement of health 
has almost insignificant effects on retirement propensities, too. Health problems are 
concentrated at the end of the working career, where the employee is likely to retire in any case. 
Well-being at work policies can also be of limited use for the same reason. 
6.  Pension reform and income inequality 
We have seen that the reform has large and fairly consistent effects in postponing retirement. 
Since early retirement is punished severely, it is of considerable interest to examine the changes 
in income inequality. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that the average pension wealth is 
decreased from 19.4 to 14.7 (in €10,000). Pension wealth is decreased in all countries if the 
reform had no influence on retirement patterns so that the pool of employed is exactly the same 
as before. This decrease is what we expected given the popularity of early retirement that is 
punished. The net present value of pension wealth takes into account the changes in pension 
wealth at each age and weights these according to hazard rates as described by (8). Using 
pooled estimation strategy results from Table 1 it can be seen that the Gini coefficients indicate 18 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
greater inequality in Belgium, Germany and Spain after the reform.
6 The Spanish increase in 
inequality is explained by the abolishment of minimum pensions, while in Germany the rich 
households benefit from low taxation of pension income. Figure 3 further shows the cumulative 
distribution of the net present value of pension wealth opportunity set before and after the 
pension reform.  
Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of net present value of pension wealth before and after 
pension reform 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP 1994-2001. 
It can be seen that the curve for the net present value of pension wealth shifts left in all 
countries, the least in Finland and to the greatest amount in Germany and Spain. Figure 4 
examines the distributional effects on net present value of an individual’s pension wealth that 
belong either in the lowest or highest quartile of household pension wealth. 
 
                                                      
6 Gini coefficients are before and after pension reform experiments 0.25 and 0.27 for Finland, 0.24 and 
0.29 for Belgium, 0.21 and 0.30 for Germany and 0.26 and 0.40 for Spain. FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 19 
 
Figure 4. Net present value of pension wealth before and after pension reform in lowest (Q1) 
and highest quartile (Q4) in the countries 
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We can observe that due to postponed retirement the net present value of pension wealth is 
increased both for the poor and rich in Belgium and Germany, since the average retirement age 
increases over 6.5 years with higher pensions. In Spain the opposite trend is explained by the 
abolishment of minimum pensions. Note that in Finland the net present value of household 
pension wealth decreases, since the unemployment pension system is relatively generous. The 
estimated postponement in retirement is only one year. However, country-specific estimation 
strategy yields postponement by three years and the net present value of pension wealth would 
remain the same as before the reform (the results not shown). Overall, we can conclude that the 
distributional consequences of the pension reform are not adverse for poor families although 
Gini coefficients indicate this. Individuals at the bottom quarter of household pension wealth 
gain from the reform too. 
7. Conclusions 
Modelling the pension system for different countries is a difficult task, as each country has its 
very many rules and exceptions. It is noteworthy that possibly also due to the pension rules the 
spikes in retirement at the ages of 60 or 65 are remarkable in Germany and Belgium, whereas in 
Finland retirement is smooth as of age 56. A robust modelling of the system for pooled data 
covering four countries has, however, been possible and is more reliable than the use of 
country-specific estimates that can overly depend on the characteristics of the existing pension 
system as for Belgium. Thereby the forward-looking measures do not only capture the 
institutional characteristics of the pension system. Analysis was, indeed, sensitive to whether 
countries are analysed separately although, at the same time, also indicate robustness of the 
model as the OV parameters were much alike in country-specific estimates. 
We show that pension reforms have to implement higher pension rights accruals than what has 
been introduced in the pension reforms during the 2000s. Actuarial reform requires higher 20 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
accruals for older ages e.g. beyond 63 years of age, and also a common reform of the 
abolishment of early retirement and a decrease in pensions by 5% for each year before age 63 
(with a maximum deduction of 30%). The latest reforms introduced in Finland with a 4.5% 
accrual rate between the ages of 63 and 68 are too low.  
The pension reform considered would exert the greatest effect in Belgium and Germany and 
would postpone retirement by around 6 years. In Finland the postponement of retirement would 
also be 3 years if the higher country-specific estimates were used. In Spain retirement is 
postponed less but this may be partly due to the estimation sample. In Belgium and Spain, the 
significance of financial incentives differs from Dellis et al. (2001) and Boldrin et al. (2002), 
while results for Germany follow Börsch-Supan, Kohnz and Schnabel (2003).  
The pecuniary incentives are also the primary ones to rely on in making pension reforms 
compared with the fine-tuning of family and work life or work satisfaction. The 20% 
improvement in well-being at work that had been experimented with an equal decrease in 
satisfaction from leisure did not largely affect retirement patterns. The same is true for health 
capital that can be rather considered as long-term investment. The subjective assessment of 
health deteriorates only at the end of the working career. It is clearly too late to influence health-
related habits when one’s health has already deteriorated. Joint retirement decisions of spouses 
did not significantly affect the individual’s retirement either: singles and married couples are 
largely on an equal footing in retirement decisions. 
Finally, the proposed pension reform would postpone more retirement of the richer segment of 
the population as compared with poorer families. The pension reform can still be described as 
distributionally fair. The distributional consequences of the pension reform are not adverse for 
poor families although generally inequality in wealth increases. Individuals at the bottom 
quarter of household pension wealth also gain from the reform when retirement is postponed. 
An additional factor that would force poor families to postpone retirement is the liquidity 
constraints faced by low-income earners, but we find surprisingly little behavioural differences 
in retirement patterns between low- and high-household pension wealth households. It is clear, 
however, that additional demand side policies may be needed. | 21 
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Appendix A. Age distribution of pension incentives, 
age profiles and pension rules and tax treatments 
 
Figure A.1 Age profile of retirement transitions by country 
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Table A.1 Summary statistics for employed individuals 54-64 years of age in the estimation sample 
All Female
All    
Male
Finland 
Female
Finland 
Male
Belgium 
Female
Belgium 
Male
Germany 
Female
Germany 
Male
Spain 
Female
Spain 
Male
Observations 4871 st-dev. 1732 3139 480 355 150 342 761 1356 341 1086
Transition to retirement 0.17 0.008 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.18
Option value 6.48 0.090 6.16 6.66 5.52 5.89 3.52 4.29 7.19 8.18 5.54 5.49
Option value spouse 1.11 0.056 1.16 1.08 1.13 2.04 1.08 0.46 1.31 1.51 0.85 0.36
Option value after reform 15.44 0.186 13.07 16.69 7.34 8.24 15.82 16.82 16.83 21.90 11.55 11.63
Pension wealth (10,000€ year 2000) 19.41 0.174 17.64 20.35 18.88 21.22 12.40 14.32 17.95 24.52 16.84 15.99
Pension wealth after reform (10,000€) 14.72 0.245 12.96 15.65 15.25 16.44 9.67 12.70 13.80 20.61 8.39 8.98
Replacement rate 64.3 % 0.003 63.1 % 65.0 % 49.9 % 48.6 % 45.4 % 49.0 % 73.0 % 75.3 % 69.2 % 62.5 %
Replacement rate after reform 46.5 % 0.005 44.2 % 47.8 % 29.3 % 28.0 % 37.1 % 42.6 % 60.9 % 64.7 % 33.3 % 33.4 %
Replacement rate at age 60 69.7 % 0.005 69.5 % 69.8 % 50.7 % 45.8 % 47.3 % 52.8 % 78.8 % 80.2 % 73.9 % 62.6 %
Replacement rate at age 60 after reform 55.6 % 0.005 53.2 % 57.0 % 36.2 % 38.2 % 50.9 % 56.1 % 64.6 % 68.4 % 36.2 % 37.4 %
Cohabiting 79.1 % 0.008 63.8 % 87.2 % 58.2 % 77.5 % 59.6 % 90.4 % 71.7 % 84.2 % 53.7 % 93.8 %
Employment, spouse 15.1 % 0.006 18.0 % 13.5 % 17.9 % 33.6 % 24.4 % 11.2 % 17.2 % 14.1 % 17.6 % 6.7 %
Male 65.3 % 0.010
McClements scale 1.90 0.00 1.87 1.92 1.86 1.91 1.80 1.93 1.87 1.91 1.92 1.91
Owner occupied 73.4 % 0.009 67.8 % 76.4 % 83.3 % 78.8 % 82.5 % 86.6 % 49.3 % 63.4 % 85.0 % 91.5 %
Age difference (years) 12.2 0.5 17.9 9.2 19.5 12.7 21.4 7.1 13.7 10.7 24.6 6.5
Satisfaction with work (rising scale 1 to 6) 4.47 0.480 4.46 4.48 4.6 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5
Satisfaction with leisure (rising scale 1to 6) 3.93 0.051 3.95 3.91 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.8
Initial bad health 12.3 % 0.009 13.4 % 11.7 % 4.9 % 4.3 % 0.0 % 0.4 % 23.7 % 21.1 % 5.8 % 4.3 %
Initial bad health spouse 10.6 % 0.003 10.4 % 10.7 % 2.4 % 2.3 % 5.5 % 4.5 % 18.4 % 18.2 % 4.5 % 4.6 %
Inpatient at hospital last 12 months 10.2 % 0.006 10.2 % 10.2 % 9.9 % 12.1 % 10.6 % 8.4 % 12.1 % 10.8 % 5.4 % 9.4 %
Inpatient at hospital spouse 1.8 % 0.002 2.2 % 1.6 % 2.3 % 4.8 % 5.0 % 1.0 % 1.8 % 1.9 % 1.8 % 0.2 %
Tertiary education 28.6 % 0.009 21.8 % 32.2 % 32.5 % 31.1 % 29.8 % 37.1 % 10.7 % 35.7 % 30.3 % 25.6 %
Supervisory job 7.8 % 0.005 4.5 % 9.6 % 10.7 % 30.8 % 8.1 % 23.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.9 % 11.8 %
Part time 6.4 % 0.005 15.3 % 1.6 % 14.0 % 6.2 % 22.9 % 2.0 % 15.8 % 0.1 % 13.3 % 2.2 %
Public employment 35.7 % 0.009 44.6 % 31.0 % 62.2 % 42.3 % 34.4 % 26.5 % 34.5 % 29.9 % 46.1 % 30.6 %
Firm size < 20 23.0 % 0.008 27.1 % 20.9 % 35.1 % 34.2 % 10.5 % 12.2 % 21.8 % 12.1 % 34.2 % 32.9 %
Age 55-59 71.9 % 0.010 74.5 % 70.6 % 75.4 % 83.2 % 88.3 % 86.6 % 74.8 % 65.3 % 67.1 % 68.3 %
Age 60-64 28.1 % 0.010 25.5 % 29.4 % 24.6 % 16.8 % 11.7 % 13.4 % 25.2 % 34.7 % 32.9 % 31.7 %
All
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP 1994-2001. 26 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Figure A.2 Age Distribution of Pension Incentives: Previous Option Value Results for Belgium 
and Germany in €10,000 (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003; Dellis et al., 2001) 
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Pension Rules and Tax Treatments 
The focus is on regulations during the sample period years 1994 to 2001. The reference year for 
figures is 2000 unless otherwise stated. Pension income is taxable income in all countries and 
work-related expenses may not be deducted. 
Finland 
The earnings-related pension depends on accrued pension rights during employment and on 
earnings in the last 10 years. The pension accruals start accumulating from the age of 23. 
Accruals in the calculation of the replacement rate vary over years. For the years before 
1.7.1962 an employee acquires a pension rate of 0.5% per year. For the years following 
1.7.1962 the pension rate is 1.5% per year. From the age of 60 onwards an employee acquires a 
pension rate of 2.5%. The maximum pension is 60% of the highest wage  max W . 
max    min  [ ,  0.6* ] Pr W W =  (a.1) 
The pensionable salary W is the gross income net of the employee's pension contributions and 
corresponds to the average salary over the last 10 years of occupation. The pension index gives 
0.5 weight on the wage index (0.2 from age 65 on) and 0.5 weight on the consumer price index 
(0.8 from age 65 onwards). The income earned after age 65 increases the accrual rate by 0.6% 
per month (but income is not taken into account in the calculation of pensionable salary). It is 
possible to retire from the age of 60 onwards. This reduces the level of pension payments by 
0.4% for every month below age 65. But we assume that the employee always has access to a 
more favourable unemployment pension pipeline or a disability pension (where the pension 
level is approximately the same as in the unemployment pension). 
The government pension is €428 a month and €327 for a married person, depending on the 
municipality of residence. This is reduced by one-half of the amount exceeding €35 a month of 
other earnings-related pension income. It is not paid if the other pension described above 
exceeds €764-856 a month, depending on municipality. A married person receives no pension if 
his earnings-related pension exceeds €754-785 a month (1998 figures). The pension income is 
taxable. Additional sickness insurance for pensioners is 2.7 (in addition to 1.5). 
 
The unemployment pension depends on the following components: 
max    min  [( )*(1 sup)* ,  0.6* ] unemp Pa b c W W =+ + +  (a.2) 
where 
a = replacement rate at the time of unemployment at age 57 or after with a yearly 
accrual of 12/800=0.015 and 0.025 as of age 60 
b = upcoming pension accrual until age 60: months of unemployment until age 60 with 
a yearly accrual of 12/1000=0.012 
c = upcoming pension since age 60: unemployment pension months until age 65 (60 or 
less) * W/ 1500 (yearly accrual 12/1500=0.008) 
sup = pension supplement after 500 days of unemployment if retired before age 60 
  sup = 0.8 u/22 / (504-u/22) 
where u = days of unemployment until age 60 and 504 shows months between age 23 
and 65.  28 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Those born after 1945 (younger than age 58 in 2002) are entitled to the pension supplement only 
as of age 65. For those born before 1945 the pension supplement is also earned during a period 
of unemployment. 
 
Disability pension consists of  
max    min  [( )* ,  0.6* ] disability P abcdW W =+ + +  (a.3) 
where 
a = replacement rate at the time of disability 
b = upcoming pension accrual until age 50: Disability months until age 50 /800 
c = upcoming pension accrual at age 50-59: Disability months at age 50-59 (120 or 
less)/1000 
d = upcoming pension at age 60-65: Disability months at age 60-64 (60 or less)/1500. 
As of age 60 the disability pension is equal to the unemployment pension. 
Belgium 
For men the conditions for obtaining a full pension is a minimum age of 65 and having a 
working career of at least 45 years. Women can obtain a full pension after a career of 42 years 
from the age of 62. Men and women can draw pension from age 60 if their career reached a 
minimum of 20 working years in 1997. The calculation of the pension P is based on the 
following formula:  
   min[ /(42    45),1] , Pr W d o r =  (a.4) 
where the replacement rate r is 0.6 for singles and 0.75 for a one-earner couple, pensionable 
salary W depends on years at work, and the share of years d completed of the full career is 42 
years for women and 45 years for men. The formula corresponds to an annual accrual rate of 
2.38 for women and 2.22 for men. The wage base is the average of the price-indexed wages 
over the period of affiliation. An important characteristic of this scheme is that periods spent in 
unemployment, inactivity due to sickness and disability and early retirement also count as 
affiliation years. Social Protection Committee (2006) argues that while the actual exit age from 
the labour market is lower than 60, the average age of take up of pensions for salaried workers 
is 64, after a career (including the assimilated periods) of 42 years. Therefore non-employment 
works poorly as a measure for retirement and hence retirement is used as the proxy instead. All 
benefits in this scheme are consumer-price indexed.  
Pension benefits are limited at both ends: for a complete career the minimum annual pension 
was €11,794 for a one-earner couple or €9,438 for individuals in 2002 (about 56% of the 
average net wages). The earnings entering the above pension formula had a ceiling of €38,678 
(120% of the average gross wage) in 2001. If the ceiling is adapted for the whole career, the 
maximum annual pension amounted to €20,894 for a one-earner couple and €16,715 for an 
individual in 2001.  
Calculations include a funded 2nd pillar scheme in line with Social Protection Committee 
(2006). For the building up of this second pillar, it has been assumed that the contribution 
period is 12 years yielding an additional actuarial accrual increment of 4.25% for a pensionable 
wage above first quarter in overall distribution and 1% for others (low-income earners). For 
average earners this represents less than one tenth of the gross pension. The lower contribution FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 29 
 
rate reflects the fact that contribution rates to second pillar pensions vary depending on the level 
of wages. 
Men may retire at the age of 60 if replaced by unemployed persons. Women may retire if 
unemployed or disabled between the ages of 61 and 65.  People can retire at the age of 60 with a 
26-year career for retirement in 2000. (A 20-year career in 1998, a 22-year career in 1998, a 24-
year career in 1999, a 30-year career in 2002, a 32-year career in 2003, a 34-year career in 2004, 
and a 35-year career in 2005). We assume entitlement to retirement for all as of age 60. Wage-
earners and self-employed pensions follow the evolution of the consumer price index, that is, 
the health consumer price index, corrected for cigarettes etc. These pensions are also irregularly 
adapted to living standards. 
Retirement through unemployment: The most prevalent individual early retirement is to pass 
through the unemployment system in which people aged 50 or more are considered ‘aged 
unemployed’, not being required to actively seek work. We have assumed that those retired 
under age 60 have used this channel if the person has been unemployed in the past year, this 
year or in the two consecutive years. It is noteworthy that the accumulation of pension rights 
stops there. 
Disability pension: The normal allowance is 65% of the lost earnings (subject to a ceiling) for 
individuals with dependants, 45% for singles without dependants, and 40% for cohabiting 
individuals without dependants. The recipient, isolated or co-habitant without dependants, is 
entitled to a rate of 65% when it is acknowledged that he or she requires the assistance of a third 
party in order to perform the basic activities of daily living. 
Germany 
In 1972 Germany underwent a major pension reform that created different incentives to retire 
earlier than 65. This had an effect on the cross-sectional distribution of retirement ages. Instead 
of a single retirement spike at age 65 the reform resulted in different spikes at ages 60, 63 and 
65 (Börsch-Supan, 2000). Individuals are entitled to the old-age pension at 63 with 35 years of 
contributions, at 65 with an additional 5 years. The retirement age has been 60 for women, but is 
being gradually shifted to 65 (assumed for both genders). The maximum of pensions is 75% of 
the mean earnings of all the insured. Old-age pension benefits are defined as 
   *  *  P EP Pension factor Pension value =  (a.5) 
EP = earnings points is the annual or reference earnings divided by the average earnings of all 
contributors. EP is computed by averaging her or his annual relative contribution positions over 
the entire earnings history. Here we evaluate earnings points using the last year earnings, which 
leads somewhat to an overestimation of the figures for the highly educated. In each year, EP is 
expressed as a multiple (minimum 75%) of the average annual contribution (roughly speaking, 
the relative income position). The reference earnings are insured employment income (up to the 
contribution ceiling) during the entire duration of the insurance period. The monthly 
contribution ceiling is €4,397 (West) and €3,630 (East). For contributions before 1973 the 
multiple cannot fall below 75%. For contributions between 1973 and 1992, multiples below 
75% are multiplied up to a maximum of 75%, effectively reducing the distribution of pension 
for workers with income positions below 50%.  
The Pension factor is usually 1 but increases if retirement is postponed. For delayed retirement 
after age 65, an added factor of 1.0 plus 0.5% for each month is used.   
The Pension value is a monthly benefit amount for one year's average covered earnings. This 
determines the income distribution between workers and pensioners. The average gross earnings 
of all contributors was €53,508 in 1999 and net earnings €33,517 in 1999, and €34,143 in 2000. 30 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
Contributions are levied on earnings between a floor of 1% and a ceiling of 170% of the average 
net earnings, thus equalling about €341 for the floor and €58,043 for the top in 2000. Benefits 
are adjusted annually for changes in the real value of pensions compared with changes in 
earnings. 
Occupational pension income and civil service income are, in principle, taxed as wage income 
as assumed here (and thus are eligible for the allowance for work-related expenses, even though 
such expenses are not usually incurred). In addition, 40% of the benefit is exempt from tax up to 
a ceiling of DEM 6 000 (DEM 6000 equals approximately 3070 euro). This rule is applied here 
for all pensions. 
The pension scheme for civil servants granted up to 75% of the last labour income for persons 
who retired before 2003. In the following years, the maximal replacement rate of 75% gradually 
decreases in eight equal steps to 71.75% and will presumably be constant from the year 2010 
onwards. Retired civil servants are granted tax exemption with 40% of the taxable pension 
benefits up to a maximum of €3,072 per year (not included in the alternative tax reforms and 
also gradually eroded as of 2005 in the current tax system). 
Unemployment pension: Unemployment compensation has been used as pre-retirement income 
in an unofficial scheme that induced very early retirement from age 56 onwards, as 
unemployment compensation is paid up to three years for elderly workers and is followed by the 
lower unemployment benefit before an unemployment pension could start at age 60; (before 
1997 the unemployment pipeline started at age 54). In addition, early retirement at age 58 was 
made possible in an official (less popular) pre-retirement scheme, in which the employer 
received a subsidy if a younger employee was hired. According to the ‘59 rules’ and ‘57 rules’ 
companies that release older workers in a ‘socially acceptable manner’, meaning, in a way, that 
they can bridge the gap to the take-up of an old-age pension with unemployment benefit, are 
allowed to shift part of the expenses onto the Federal Employment Office. The Act of the 
Consolidation of Job Promotion from 1982 obliged companies to pay the earnings-related 
unemployment benefit plus related social security contributions for up to one year when firing 
an older worker who had been employed at the company for at least 10 years. Here we assume 
early retirement as of age 56 before 1997 and as of age 57 since 1997 (the pension level 
depending on the work experience gained) and apply yearly deductions of pensions of 3.6% for 
retired males before age 65 and for retired females before age 63. The additional accrual for 
retirement since age 65 is 6%. After the year 2011, the specific regulations for the retirement 
age for the unemployed will be abolished completely. 
Disability pension: Disability pension benefits can be received if one passes a strict earnings test 
(full benefits) or a weaker earnings test (before age 60: 60% of the applicable old-age pension). 
Survivor pensions are 60% of the husband’s applicable pension for spouses that are 45 and over 
or if children are in the household, otherwise 25%. Survivor benefits are a large part of the 
public pension budget and of the total pension wealth. In addition to the above benefits, transfer 
payments enable one to have what is referred to as ‘pre-retirement’. We apply disability pension 
if the person is receiving sickness or invalidity benefits this year or next. There is no age limit 
and yearly pension deductions of 3.6% for early retirement do not apply. 
 
Taxation of wage earners and pensioners 
There is no special tax relief for older people. Income up to a statutory line is exempt from tax. 
This was around DEM 13 000 per person in 1999. This provision applies equally to citizens of 
pensionable age and those of working age. The proportion of the income subject to tax varies 
with the age at which the individual retired. For retirement at age 62, only 27% of the pension is 
taxable. The share at other illustrative retirement ages is as follows: 38% at age 55, 32% at age FLEXIBLE PENSION SYSTEMS | 31 
 
60 and 21% at age 70. There is an additional deduction of DEM 200. Social security 
contributions are levied on retirement benefits for health insurance at a rate of about 7% (rates 
differ between health insurance companies) and for long-term care insurance at a rate of 0.85% 
before April 2004 and 1.7% since April 2004. 
Social security contributions are paid based on the total amount of the pension, but are not the 
same as for employed people. Retired wage earners pay 3.5% in social security contributions for 
sickness and invalidity, provided that (in 2001) this contribution does not mean that the pension 
paid to single people is less than €1,117, or €1,396 for married people. On top of that, another 
contribution ranging between 0.5% and 2% is paid for pension financing, according to the 
pension level and only for people receiving pensions higher than €1,975 (single) or €2,257 
(married). This is called the 'solidarity contribution'. Civil servants pay the same contributions + 
0.5% to finance funeral benefits. Wage-earner pensions follow the evolution of the consumer 
price index, that is, the health consumer price index, corrected for cigarettes, etc. These 
pensions are also irregularly adapted to living standards. 
Spain 
The retirement programme we label as official (or regular) offers two options: early retirement 
and normal retirement. Early retirement is possible from age 60 but it only applies to workers 
who started their contributive career before 1967. The normal retirement age is 65, although 
some professional groups have lower normal retirement ages that are ignored here. (Miners, 
military personnel, policemen and fishermen are the main ones.) Collective wage settlements 
often impose mandatory retirement at age 65, facilitate retirement at 64 with full benefits, or 
encourage retirement between 60 and 63 through lump sum payments. 
As described by Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2002) a retiring worker receives an initial 
monthly pension  tt Pr W = , where the pensionable salary (base reguladora)  t W   is a weighted 
average of monthly earnings over the last 8 years before retirement 
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where  tj W −  is wage indexed wage and  tj I −  the consumer price index in month j  before 
retirement. Pensions are paid in fourteen annual instalments, hence the division by 112 in the 
previous formula. Beginning in 1997, the number of reference years has been increased from the 
initial 8 years by one every year until 2003, to reach a total of 15 years. In our calculations we 
use the wage index to evaluate nominal wage growth to the wage level given by an average of 
the last two periods. These wages are deflated by the consumer price index according to the 
formula given by (a.2). The replacement rate r  depends on the age of the retirees and on the 
number of years of contribution. For age equal to or larger than 65, this is equal to 
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In early retirement for ages between 60 and 65, r   is determined by the previous formula 
multiplied by a penalisation factor. This is equal to 0.6 at 60, and increases 0.08 each year, until 
reaching the value of 1 at age 65. When the age is below 60, r  = 0, while workers receive 
unemployment benefits. Since 1997 the formula for computing r has been changed to the 
following 32 | HANNU PIEKKOLA 
 
< ⎧
⎪ +− ≤ < ⎪ = ⎨ +− ≤ < ⎪
⎪ ≤ ⎩
01 5
0.5 0.03( 15) 15 2
0.8 0.02( 25) 25 35
13 5
if n
ni f n
r
ni f n
if n
 (a.8) 
The penalisation factor is the same, with an exception made for workers with 40 or more years 
of contributions. The replacement rate of a public servant is proxied following Boldring et al. 
(2002) by min(1,1 0.366(35 )) rn =− − . Wage-earner pensions follow the evolution of the 
consumer price index. 
 
Maximum and minimum pension 
Pensions are subject to a ceiling, legislated annually and roughly equal to the ceiling on covered 
earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about 4.3 times the minimum wage (salario mínimo 
interprofesional, or SMI) and about 1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. If the initial old-age pension, computed as above, is below a 
minimum, then the minimum pension is paid. The latter is also legislated annually. Other things 
being equal, minimum pensions are higher for those who are older than 65 or have a dependent 
spouse. In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as nominal wages, 
whereas maximum pensions grew at the rate of inflation. The ratio between the minimum old-
age pension and the minimum wage has been increasing steadily since the late 1970s (it was 
75% in 1975) until it reached almost 100% in the early 1990s. The earnings related pensions are 
topped up to the minimum levels for pensions. The share of pensioners receiving the minimum 
pension is declining and was 28.3% in 2005. (The proportion of new pensioners receiving 
minimum pension decreased from 30.1% in 1995 to 18.4% in 2004.) 
The normal retirement age is 65 but early retirement at age 60 is permitted as a general rule for 
those who became affiliated to the Social Security system (Mutualidades Laborales) before 
1967. The replacement rate for early retirees is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year 
below age 65. Starting from 1997, workers who retire after the age of 60 with 40 or more 
contributive years are charged a penalty of only 7% for each year under age 65. 
Unemployment benefits are 70% of reference earnings for the first 180 days; and 60% 
afterwards. The maximum is 170%, 195% or 220% of the minimum wage (Salario Mínimo 
Interprofesional) according to the number of dependent children. The minimum is 100% of the 
minimum wage with dependent children and 75% of the minimum wage without dependent 
children. The maximum duration of benefit is 720 days with 2,160 days or more of 
contributions. 
The disability pension is ignored in Spain (because of strict rules). Unemployment benefits are 
generally conditional on previous spells of contributions and are available only for workers in 
the General Regime (RGSS) of the Spanish Social Security (S3) system. There are two 
continuation programmes for those who have exhausted their entitlement to contributory 
unemployment benefits: one for those aged 45+ (UB45+ programme) and the other for those 
aged 52+ (UB52+ programme). The latter is a special subsidy for unemployed people that are 
older than 52, lack other income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at 
least 6 years in their life and, except for age, satisfy all the requirements for an old-age pension. About AIM (Adequacy & Sustainability of Old-Age Income Maintenance) 
he AIM project aims at providing a strengthened conceptual and scientific basis for assessing 
the capacity of European pension systems to deliver adequate old age income maintenance in a 
context of low fertility and steadily increasing life expectancy. The main focus is on the 
capacity of social security systems to contribute to preventing poverty among the old and elderly and 
more generally to enable persons to take all appropriate measures to ensure stable or “desired” 
distribution of income over the full life cycle. In addition it will explore and examine the capacity of 
pension systems to attain broad social objectives with respect to inter- and intra generational 
solidarity. 
Furthermore it will examine the capacity of pension systems to allow workers to change job or to 
move temporarily out of the labour market and to adapt career patterns without losing vesting of 
pensions rights. The project will also address the specific challenges with respect to providing 
appropriate old age income for women. 
A general objective of the research project is to clearly identify and analyse the potential trade-offs 
between certain social policy objectives and overall stability of public debt.  
AIM is financed under the 6th EU Research Framework Programme. It started in May 2005 and 
includes partners from both the old and new EU member states. 
Participating institutes 
•  Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Belgium, coordinator  
•  Federal Planning Bureau, FPB, Belgium  
•  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschafsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research), DIW, 
Germany  
•  Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos, (Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), ETLA, Finland  
•  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada , FEDEA, Spain  
•  Social and Cultural Planning Office, SCP, Netherlands 
•  Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (Institute for Studies and Economic Analysis), ISAE, Italy  
•  National Institute for Economic and Social Research, NIESR, United Kingdom  
•  Centrum Analiz Spolleczno-Ekonomicznych (Center for Social and Economic Research), CASE, 
Poland  
•  Tarsadalomkutatasi Informatikai Egyesules (TARKI Social Research Informatics Centre), TARKI, 
Hungary  
•  Centre for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, CeRP, Italy  
•  Institute for Economic Research, IER, Slovak Republic  
•  Inštitut za ekonomska raziskovanja (Institute for economic research), IER, Slovenia  
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